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Multijurisdictional Anti-Bribery 
Enforcement Actions 
 
Jessie M. Reniere* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2017, a Swedish company agreed to pay 
approximately $483 million to the U.S. Treasury general fund in 
fines, penalties, and disgorgement for bribing an Uzbek public 
official in order to secure improper business advantages.1 That 
company was also prosecuted by Sweden and the Netherlands and 
agreed to pay approximately $965 million total to the three 
countries involved.2 The United States, with seemingly weak 
connections to the case, collected nearly half of the global 
settlement for the U.S. Treasury. It is unclear what the United 
States policy interest was in prosecuting foreign bribery that, on 
its face, had little to do with the United States, especially when 
other countries with stronger connections were also prosecuting 
the company. 
 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 
2019. The author would like to thank Professor Louise Ellen Teitz and 
Professor William B.F. Steinman for their invaluable guidance and support. 
1. See discussion infra section II.B.i; see also Press Release, Dep’t of 
Justice, Telia Company AB and Its Uzbek Subsidiary Enter Into a Global 
Foreign Bribery Resolution of More Than $965 Million for Corrupt Payments 
in Uzb. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/telia-company-ab-and- 
its-uzbek-subsidiary-enter-global-foreign-bribery-resolution-more-965 
[https://perma.cc/Q94A-LN3A]. 
2. Id. 
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The United States has been the global leader in the fight 
against foreign bribery and was the first country to explicitly 
prohibit its citizens and companies from bribing foreign officials.3 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has stated that “bribery is a widespread phenomenon in 
international business transactions, including trade and 
investment, which raises serious moral and political concerns, 
undermines good governance and economic development, and 
distorts international competitive conditions.”4 It is  estimated 
that as much as $1.5 trillion each year are paid as bribes to 
foreign officials in order to secure improper advantages in 
international business.5 While foreign bribery has significant 
negative consequences in international business, it also 
particularly harms developing countries.6 The State Department 
describes foreign bribery as having “pernicious effects” on 
“economic development, rule of law, and democracy.”7 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the U.S. law that 
bans foreign bribery, was enacted as a response to the Watergate 
scandal.8 Prior to the FCPA’s enactment, the United States did 
not expressly prohibit bribing foreign officials or require disclosure 
 
 
3. Spotlight: History of the FCPA, PBS (Feb. 13, 2009), 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/bribe/2009/02/history-of-the- 
fcpa.html [https://perma.cc/MFM2-2WX4]. 
4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions pmbl., Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD 
Convention]. 
5. Daniel Kaufmann, Myths and Realities of Governance and 
Corruption, WORLD BANK 81, 83, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/2-1_Governance_and_Corruption_ 
Kaufmann.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY3Y-XC4X] (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). 
6. Alexandra Wrage, Bribery is Bad. . . for Business, FORBES (Jan. 25, 
2017, 10:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrawrage/2017/01/25/ 
bribery-is-bad-for-business/#4e1fcbb64a42 [https://perma.cc/ZRZ5-42TB]; see 
Corruption: Cost for Developing Countries, TRANSPARENCY INT’L U.K., 
http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption/corruption-statistics/corruption- 
cost-for-developing-countries/#.WsU4QyPMzOQ [https://perma.cc/2YU5- 
MUJA] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018). 
7. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN BRIBERY, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/ 
ifd/oma/foreignbribery/index.htm [https://perma.cc/62CM-8Q94] (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2018). 
8. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE 
NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS xvii (2nd ed. 2010). 
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of any foreign bribery.9 The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) began looking into allegations that leading U.S. 
corporations had made undisclosed payments to President Nixon’s 
re-election campaign in return for political favors from the 
administration.10 It discovered that hundreds of companies had 
been hiding millions of dollars in slush funds to be used for a 
number of different purposes, including making illicit payments to 
foreign officials.11 
Congress recognized that foreign bribery has consequences for 
United States foreign policy.12 Furthermore, Congress was 
motivated by “post-Watergate morality” and the idea that by 
prohibiting these payments, U.S. companies would be able to 
resist the demand for them.13 Enacting anti-bribery legislation 
would also show that the United States was taking a global 
leadership position on the issue.14 President Carter signed the 
 
 
9. DAVID A. STEIGER, TRANSACTIONS WITHOUT BORDERS: A CLIENT AND 
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO OVERSEAS OPERATIONS 129 (2014). 
10. Id.; MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW 
ERA 3 (2014). 
11. STEIGER, supra note 9, at 129; KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 3. 
12. In recognition of that fact, Senator Frank Church’s committee (the 
Church Committee) held several hearings on the topic, focusing on U.S. 
corporate political contributions to foreign officials. KOEHLER, supra note 10, 
at 3–4. During one of the hearings, Senator Church said that American 
companies’ participation in foreign bribery “only serve[s] to discredit them 
and the United States. Ultimately, [foreign bribery] create[s] the conditions 
which bring to power political forces that are no friends of ours . . . .” Id. at 6. 
He further stated that, 
[p]ayments by Lockheed alone may very well advance the 
communists in Italy. In Japan, a mainstay of our foreign policy in 
the Far East, the government is reeling as a consequence of 
payments by Lockheed. Inquiries have begun in many other 
countries. The Communist bloc chortles with glee at the sight of 
corrupt capitalism. 
Id. at 7. Representative Robert Nix, who chaired the House hearings on 
the issue, said, “[t]he interference in democratic elections with corporate 
gifts undermines everything we are trying to do as a leader of the free 
world.” Id. at 6. 
13. Id. at 7. 
14. Id. Representative Stephen Solarz stated during a House hearing, 
[w]hat is at stake here is . . . the reputation of our own country . . . 
we have an obligation to set a standard of honesty and integrity in 
our business dealings not only at home but also abroad which will be 
a beacon for the light of integrity for the rest of the world. 
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FCPA into law on December 19, 1977,15 and while enforcement 
was almost non-existent from the time of the statute’s enactment 
until roughly 2002, the FCPA has become a crucial compliance 
issue for companies now that U.S. enforcement agencies 
aggressively pursue FCPA violations.16 
Other countries have enacted and begun to enforce their own 
anti-bribery laws, leading to overlapping jurisdiction in FCPA 
cases.17 The FCPA gives the United States expansive jurisdiction 
to prosecute foreign bribery cases, and other countries’ anti- 
bribery laws give them similarly expansive jurisdiction.18 When a 
company pays a bribe to a foreign official, two countries already 
have jurisdiction—the country where the company is based and 
the country in which the foreign official is based.19 In many 
situations, several other countries may also have jurisdictional 
ties to the case.20 Due to this overlapping jurisdiction, companies 
may face prosecution multiple times for the same underlying 
misconduct.21 
There is no existing law to prevent the United States from 
prosecuting companies that have already resolved bribery charges 
with other countries.22 Double jeopardy does not apply to 
 
Id. at 7–8. 
15. STEIGER, supra note 9, at 129. It has been amended twice since then, 
in 1988 and 1998. DEMING, supra note 8, at 3. 
16. Mike Koehler, The Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
907, 913 (2010); KOEHLER, supra note 10, at xii. 
17. Jay Holtmeier, Cross-Border Corruption Enforcement: A Case for 
Measured Coordination Among Multiple Enforcement Authorities, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 493, 495 (2015). 
18. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaty Double Jeopardy: The OECD Anti- 
Bribery Convention and the FCPA, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 1321, 1326–30 (2012). 
19. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 496. 
20. Id. 
21. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1329. 
22. Frederick T. Davis, International Double Jeopardy: US Prosecutions 
and the Developing Law in Europe, 31 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 57, 65 (2016). The 
United States did sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) in 1966, which provides that “‘[n]o one shall be liable to be 
tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally 
convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each 
country.’” Id. at 76 (alteration in original). However, the United States 
expressly stated upon signing the ICCPR “that it did not create any 
enforceable rights in the United States” and noted “its ‘understanding’ that 
‘the prohibition upon double jeopardy . . . [applies] only when the judgment of 
acquittal has been rendered by a court of the same governmental unit . . . as 
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prosecutions brought by separate sovereigns under their own 
distinct laws, and the primary international anti-bribery treaty— 
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention)—does not provide a binding mechanism to address 
the issue of duplicative enforcement actions.23 Given the FCPA’s 
relatively broad jurisdictional reach, and the aggressive stance of 
the U.S. enforcement agencies, there are instances when the 
United States is involved in multijurisdictional enforcement 
actions even though its ties to the matter are weak. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to discern clear patterns from recent 
multijurisdictional enforcement actions to explain U.S. 
enforcement policy or the reasoning behind U.S. portions of total 
global settlements. 
This Comment makes two arguments. First,  U.S. 
enforcement agencies could adopt a policy of self-restraint in 
foreign bribery cases by declining to prosecute when there is no 
strong public policy reason for United States  involvement. 
Second, U.S. enforcement agencies should make their enforcement 
policy more transparent, specifically as to the justification for 
pursuing cases where there are minimal jurisdictional ties, and as 
to the reasoning behind the portion of global settlement money 
U.S. enforcement agencies take. 
Expansive jurisdiction is not necessarily undesirable—in fact, 
having many countries with broad and overlapping jurisdiction 
helps to ensure that companies that have engaged in corrupt acts 
do not “slip through the cracks.” However, it would be better from 
a policy perspective for each country, particularly the aggressive 
enforcers like the United States, to show self-restraint in 
multijurisdictional cases given that companies are extremely 
unlikely to fight the charges.24 Furthermore, unpredictable 
 
is seeking a new trial for the same cause.’” Id. at 99 (alteration in original). 
The ICCPR has not been successfully used as a valid defense in United States 
courts because the treaty is not “self-executing.” Id. 
23. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1322–23; Davis, supra note 22, at 62. 
There are other global and regional anti-corruption treaties, but this 
Comment will focus only on the OECD Convention. 
24. Koehler, supra note 16, at 927 (“Simply put, challenging the DOJ is 
too risky. In fact, no company has challenged the DOJ in an FCPA 
enforcement action in the last twenty years.”). Furthermore,  cooperation 
with the Department of Justice is one of the key factors in the DOJ’s decision 
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enforcement policy and the potential for duplicative enforcement 
actions can deter companies from self-reporting any violations and 
can discourage cooperation with enforcement agencies.25 This is 
counterproductive to the purpose and goals of global anti-bribery 
laws—eliminating foreign bribery from international business 
transactions.26 The new Department of Justice (DOJ) policy 
against “piling on,” announced in May 2018, is an 
acknowledgment of the problem and a step in the right direction, 
but the policy itself lacks concrete detail and therefore still does 
not create predictability.27 
As described above, this Comment argues for a policy of both 
self-restraint and transparency in multijurisdictional enforcement 
actions, rather than the application of a strict double jeopardy 
style rule under which multijurisdictional violations are 
prosecuted by only one enforcement authority. The United States 
has led the way in creating a more level playing field in 
international business, and at this point, not enough other 
countries consistently enforce their anti-bribery laws to justify the 
United States retreating from multijurisdictional enforcement in 
all cases.28 There are likely situations when other countries’ 
 
 
of whether or not to bring a criminal indictment, and “to challenge the DOJ’s 
theories, its interpretation of facts, or to raise valid and legitimate FCPA 
defenses is not to cooperate with the investigation . . . .” Id. at 925. 
25. See Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 514–17. 
26. See id. 
27. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks to the New York City 
Bar White Collar Crime Institute (May 9, 2018), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-rosenstein-delivers-remarks- 
new-york-city-bar-white-collar [https://perma.cc/CM5X-NCPF]. 
28. From 1977 through 2017 there were 349 foreign bribery enforcement 
actions worldwide, and the United States was responsible for 236 of those 
(68%). Global Enforcement Report 2017, TRACE INT’L (Mar. 2018), 
https://traceinternational.org/Uploads/PublicationFiles/GER2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TCF7-L979]. European countries account for 27%, while 
Asia Pacific, the Americas (excluding the United States), and the Middle East 
each accounted for 3% or less. Id. As of 2012, only seven of thirty-seven 
countries (most of the parties to the OECD Convention, at the time) were 
designated as having “active enforcement.” Exporting Corruption? Country 
Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Progress Report 2012, 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L (Sept. 6, 2012), https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/ 
publication/exporting_corruption_country_enforcement_of_the_oecd_anti_bri 
bery_conventio   [https://perma.cc/V8R2-ZBJB]. Twelve countries were 
deemed to have “moderate enforcement,” while the remaining eighteen were 
classified as having “little enforcement” or “no enforcement.” Id. 
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enforcement actions are not strong enough to properly deter and 
punish companies for their corrupt acts, or when the countries 
that should prosecute choose not to, for whatever reason. The 
United States should be able to insert itself into these situations 
when there are good policy reasons to do so. However, U.S. 
enforcement agencies can be clearer in their public statements 
about the reasons for involvement in those cases, and might 
refrain from action in situations where there is no policy reason or 
need for United States involvement. 
Part I of this Comment provides a basic overview of the 
FCPA’s statutory provisions, the enforcement agencies and 
enforcement mechanisms, and the scope of U.S. jurisdiction. Part 
II examines the issue of overlapping jurisdiction in foreign bribery 
cases and analyzes the four multijurisdictional enforcement 
actions resolved in 2017. Part III proposes increased self-restraint 
and transparency in U.S. enforcement policy, supported by the 
U.S. approach to state-federal successive prosecutions and the 
spirit of the OECD Convention’s jurisdiction provisions. 
I. FCPA FUNDAMENTALS 
This Part provides a basic overview of the FCPA. While the 
general idea behind the statute is easy to understand—paying 
bribes to foreign officials to obtain or retain business is 
prohibited—in practice it is much more complex. Subpart A 
describes the main statutory provisions—the anti-bribery and 
accounting provisions. Subpart B reviews the United States 
agencies that enforce FCPA violations and the means by which 
they resolve FCPA cases with companies, often with little or no 
judicial oversight. Subpart C explains the fines and penalties 
companies face, including the relatively new use of civil 
disgorgement, which has contributed to the enormous settlement 
amounts seen today. Finally, Subpart D covers the FCPA’s wide- 
reaching jurisdictional coverage and the implications for 
companies operating internationally. 
A. The Anti-Bribery and Accounting Provisions 
The FCPA has two main sets of provisions: the anti-bribery 
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provisions and the accounting provisions.29 The two sets of 
provisions “were intended to work in tandem and thereby 
complement one another.”30 The anti-bribery provisions generally 
prohibit corrupt payments to foreign officials made to assist with 
obtaining or retaining business.31 
The accounting provisions themselves impose two separate 
requirements on all companies, regardless of where they are based 
or established, that maintain a class of securities registered on a 
United States exchange, or that are otherwise required to file 
reports with the SEC.32 These companies are referred to as 
“issuers.”33 First, issuers must adhere to the so-called books and 
records provision, which obliges issuers to keep accurate books, 
records, and accounts.34 In other words, if a company bribes a 
foreign official and does not record that bribe in its books and 
records, or records the charge but does not accurately describe it 
as an illicit payment, it has violated the accounting and 
recordkeeping provisions.35 Thus, any company found in violation 
of the anti-bribery provisions will most likely be in violation of the 
books and records provision as well, as it is highly unlikely a 
company would accurately record bribes on its books.36 
Second, issuers are required to devise and maintain adequate 
internal controls to ensure that funds are expended in accordance 
with management’s general and specific authorizations.37 
Essentially, the internal controls provision compels issuers to 
implement and adhere to written compliance procedures as to how 
they spend corporate funds.38 In many FCPA enforcement 
 
 
29. DEMING, supra note 8, at 3–4. 
30. Id. at 4. 
31. ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL 
LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS 1 (2nd ed. 2012). 
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2012). 
33. Id. § 78m(a). 
34. Id. §§ 78m(a), 78m(b)(2)(A); TARUN, supra note 31, at 1, 13. 
35. TARUN, supra note 31, at 13. 
36. See id. 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
38. CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENF’T DIV. OF THE SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT 38, 40 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/ 
legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUJ5-GPYK] [hereinafter 
FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
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actions, companies found in violation of the anti-bribery provisions 
are also found to have violated the internal controls requirement; 
the logic is that if the company had sufficient internal controls, 
they would have prevented any misconduct.39 
Although the anti-bribery provisions may seem simple on 
their face, they are in fact quite complex and companies may 
easily run afoul of them. A payment does not need to actually be 
made for there to be an anti-bribery violation; an offer, promise, or 
authorization of a corrupt payment will suffice.40 Furthermore, 
the definition of “foreign official” is quite expansive. The  
definition provided in the statute is: 
Any officer or employee of a foreign government or any 
department, agency or instrumentality thereof, or of a 
public international organization, or any person acting in 
an official capacity or on behalf of any such government, 
department, agency or instrumentality or for, or on behalf 
of, any such public international organization.41 
Moreover, the anti-bribery provisions also apply to illicit 
payments rendered to foreign political parties, party officials, 
candidates for office, employees of state-owned enterprises, and 
officials of quasi-governmental agencies.42 
The payment, or offer of payment, must be made “corruptly” 
but can take many forms.43 It can be money, but “anything of 
value” is considered a bribe.44 Enforcement actions demonstrate 
that, in addition to funds, bribes can be lavish trips, gifts in-kind, 
 
 
39. Id. at 40. 
40. TARUN, supra note 31, at 3. The DOJ also frequently charges 
companies and individuals with conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA. Id. at 17–18. 
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A); § 78dd-(2)(h)(2)(A); §  78dd-3(f)(2)(A)  
(2012). 
42. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 19–21; see United States v. 
Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014) (laying out the factors for 
determining whether an entity is an instrumentality of a foreign 
government); see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. 
Olympus Latin America, Inc., No. 16-3525(MF) (D.N.J. Mar. 1 2016) 
(available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/831256/download 
[https://perma.cc/Z58S-55LJ]) (holding that doctors at state-owned hospitals 
were government officials). 
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a); § 78dd-2(a); §78dd-3(a). 
44. Id. 
 176 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:167 
 
and even employment provided to a foreign official’s relatives.45 
There is no de minimis exception.46 
A company may also be liable for bribes offered or paid by any 
third-party agents the company has hired to assist in foreign 
jurisdictions, such as marketing representatives,  consultants, 
joint venture partners, distributors, law firms, or accountants.47 
The company must have had knowledge of the third-party agent’s 
actions, but that knowledge could be actual or constructive.48 The 
knowledge requirement is met if a person is aware that there is a 
high probability that an improper payment will be made or 
offered.49  “Willful blindness,” “deliberate ignorance,” and “taking 
a ‘head-in-the-sand’” attitude all constitute knowledge under the 
FCPA.50 These third-party agent relationships present a serious 
compliance challenge for companies:51 “[B]ecause of respondeat 
superior and the realities of the global marketplace, FCPA 
compliance can be difficult for even the most well-managed and 
well-intentioned business organizations with a commitment to 
 
 
45. TARUN, supra note 31, at 4. In 2015, BNY Mellon faced  FCPA 
charges for providing student internships to government officials’ family 
members; the interns in question did not go through the company’s 
competitive hiring process. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC 
Charges BNY Mellon with FCPA Violations (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-170.html 
[https://perma.cc/MN48-VHYY]). 
46. TARUN, supra note 31, at 4. The FCPA does contain an exception for 
so-called “facilitating payments” or “grease payments,” but it is questionable 
how much this exception helps companies during an investigation. KOEHLER, 
supra note 10, at 120. “Facilitating payments” are defined as “facilitating or 
expediting payment[s] to a foreign official . . . the purpose of which is to 
expedite or to secure the performance of a routine government action by a 
foreign official . . . .” Id. at 116. Some examples the statute gives of “routine 
government action” include obtaining permits, licenses, or other documents to 
do business in that country; processing visas and work orders; and scheduling 
inspections. Id. at 117. Despite the legal authority for the exception, many 
FCPA enforcement actions today concern payments made or offered for the 
purpose of obtaining permits, licenses, or other documents to do business in a 
particular country; in fact, the SEC’s former Assistant Director of 
Enforcement has called the facilitating payment exception “illusory.” Id. at 
119–20. 
47. TARUN, supra note 31, at 7. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. DEMING, supra note 8, at 60. 
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FCPA compliance.”52 
If a company or individual is accused of having made an 
improper payment, there are two affirmative defenses that may be 
raised: the reasonable and bona fide expenditures defense and the 
local law defense.53 The reasonable and bona fide expenditures 
defense applies to: 
the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value 
that was made, was a reasonable and bona fide 
expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, 
incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official . . . and was 
directly related to: (a) the promotion, demonstration, or 
explanation of products or services; or (b) the execution or 
performance of a contract with a foreign government or 
agency thereof.54 
The local law defense applies when the payment in question is 
actually permissible under the written law of the foreign official’s 
country, with emphasis on written law: the fact that the practice is 
customary or widespread in a certain country is not sufficient.55 
While companies make payments every day that qualify as bona 
fide expenditures,56 the local law defense in practice will not 
provide much help to a company under investigation.57 
B. Enforcement Agencies and Resolution Vehicles 
In the U.S., two agencies are responsible for enforcing FCPA 
violations, and they often both bring enforcement actions for the 
 
 
 
52. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 54. 
53. Id. at 120–21. 
54. Id. at 123. 
55. Id. at 121. In United States v. Kozeny, the defendant alleged that he 
would have been “free from criminal responsibility” under the laws of 
Azerbaijan, the country of the foreign official in question and, therefore, he 
should be able to invoke the local law exception. Id. at 121–22 (referring to 
582 F. Supp. 2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). The court disagreed and found that the 
payment was in fact illegal, even if the defendant would not have been 
prosecuted in Azerbaijan due to a technicality. Id. 
56. Bill Steinman, Bill Steinman: How to Handle Mandated Per Diems 
with Foreign Government Customers, FCPA BLOG (Mar. 2, 2016, 10:08 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/3/2/bill-steinman-how-to-handle- 
mandated-per-diems-with-foreign.html [https://perma.cc/KW6G-G33Y]. 
57. STEIGER, supra note 9, at 152. 
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same instance of misconduct.58 The DOJ is responsible for 
bringing all criminal charges, both for the anti-bribery provisions 
and for willful violations of the accounting and record-keeping 
provisions.59 The SEC brings civil actions for violations of the anti-
bribery provisions and accounting and record-keeping provisions; 
the SEC only has jurisdiction over issuers and individuals acting 
on behalf of issuers.60  The DOJ also brings  civil actions against 
all companies and individuals not covered by the SEC’s 
authority.61 If both enforcement agencies have jurisdiction in a 
particular case, they will “typically conduct parallel or joint 
investigations” and will bring “simultaneous criminal charges, 
civil complaints, deferred prosecution agreements, and/or consent 
decrees.”62 
FCPA cases against companies very rarely go to trial.63 
Instead, the DOJ and SEC use other means to resolve FCPA 
matters. The DOJ resolves criminal matters with companies 
through plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, non- 
prosecution agreements, and declinations.64 Plea agreements are 
reserved for the most egregious cases of misconduct, typically 
where senior management was involved in the bribery, or where 
the company failed to voluntarily disclose the misconduct or 
cooperate with the enforcement agencies.65 
In most instances when companies are subject to criminal 
prosecution for FCPA violations, those companies will enter into a 
non-prosecution agreement or deferred-prosecution agreement 
with the DOJ.66 A non-prosecution agreement (NPA) is a formal, 
written agreement in which the enforcement agency agrees not to 
pursue an action and the company agrees to cooperate fully, but 
 
58. DEMING, supra note 8, at 75–76. 
59. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 54. 
60. DEMING, supra note 8, at 75; KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 54–55. 
61. DEMING, supra note 8, at 75. 
62. TARUN, supra note 31, at 249. 
63. Koehler, supra note 16, at 927. 
64. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 74. 
65. Id. 
66. DEMING, supra note 8, at 79; Koehler, supra note 16, at 928, 933.  
“The DOJ’s use of NPAs and DPAs has exploded in recent years. Professor 
Peter Henning, a former DOJ prosecutor and SEC enforcement official, 
recently noted that NPAs and DPAs ‘have become almost the accepted norm’ 
and ‘there is even an expectation that companies will receive them.’”  
Koehler, supra note 16, at 933. 
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no formal charges are filed: the agreement is maintained by the 
DOJ and the company.67 In a deferred prosecution agreement 
(DPA), on the other hand, the enforcement agency files formal 
charges in the appropriate court and agrees not to proceed with 
the enforcement action if the company agrees to cooperate fully 
during the deferred prosecution period.68 
While NPAs and DPAs are beneficial for companies seeking to 
bring the matter to a speedy resolution,69 there is very little 
judicial scrutiny of those agreements, which may give the 
enforcement agencies “unchecked power subject to  abuse.”70 
There is no judicial scrutiny of NPAs, given that they are not filed 
with a court; DPAs are, in theory, subject to judicial scrutiny 
because they are filed with a court, but in practice there is little 
judicial oversight:71 
[T]he first-of-its-kind [Government Accountability Office] 
report found that judges routinely “rubber-stamp” DPAs 
without inquiring into whether factual evidence exists to 
support the essential elements of the crime “alleged” or to 
determine whether valid and legitimate defenses are 
relevant to the “alleged” conduct. In fact, no court has 
ever rejected an NPA or DPA and all “have been approved 
without judicial modification.”72 
Despite the benefits of non-prosecution or deferred 
prosecution to companies, these agreements lead to unfairness in 
the resolution process. Commentators have noted that “[t]hese 
agreements are made under duress. The economic reality is that  
if the corporation refuses to assent to the [DPA], the result will 
likely be the death of the corporation or alternatively, severe 
financial consequences that will gravely injure the corporation.”73 
 
 
67. DEMING, supra note 8, at 79; Koehler, supra note 16, at 928–29. 
68. DEMING, supra note 8, at 79; Koehler, supra note 16, at 928. 
69. DEMING, supra note 8, at 79. 
70. Koehler, supra note 16, at 938. 
71.    Id. at 935. 
72.    Id. at 936. 
73. Id. at 937–38 (citing Candace Zierdt & Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate 
Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 KY. 
L.  J.  1, 14  (2007)). The classic example of this is Arthur Anderson, “a 
company that died upon criminal conviction notwithstanding the fact that the 
U.S. Supreme Court later reversed its conviction.” Id. at 938. 
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As a result, U.S. enforcement agencies are able to push the 
boundaries of their jurisdiction, and companies accept the 
enforcement agencies’ interpretation of the law, even if a court 
might reach a different conclusion.74 
The remaining way the DOJ resolves FCPA matters with 
companies is through declinations—in other words, the DOJ 
declines to bring charges altogether.75 The DOJ exercises this 
option when a company self-discloses the misconduct to the 
enforcement agencies and fully cooperates in the investigation.76 
The DOJ’s Corporate Enforcement Policy, formerly known as the 
Pilot Program, does presume that companies will receive a 
declination if they meet the policy’s criteria.77 However, it can be 
 
74. Id. at 907, 946. 
75. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 75. 
76. Id. at 77–79. See the Morgan Stanley 2012 declination for example. 
Recent Declination in Morgan Stanley DOJ Case Spells Out Keys to Effective 
FCPA Compliance Policy, LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/ 
communities/corporatecounselnewsletter/b/newsletter/archive/2012/10/14/rec 
ent-declination-in-morgan-stanley-doj-case-spells-out-keys-to-effective-fcpa- 
compliance-policy.aspx [https://perma.cc/5AR6-AFR2] (last visited Oct. 10, 
2018); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Morgan Stanley Managing 
Director Pleads Guilty for Role in Evading Internal Controls Required by 
FCPA (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-morgan-stanley- 
managing-director-pleads-guilty-role-evading-internal-controls-required 
[https://perma.cc/6NUG-D68P]. 
77. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-47.120 
(2018) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm- 
9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977#9-47.120  [https://perma.cc/T749- 
65XQ]. The Pilot Program was announced by the DOJ in 2016 as a one-year 
program to try to encourage more companies to voluntarily disclose FCPA 
violations. If a company met the program’s criteria, it would be eligible for 
significant benefits in resolving the matter with the DOJ. Dept. of Justice, 
Criminal   Division   Launches  New  FCPA   Pilot Program  (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/criminal-division-launches-new- 
fcpa-pilot-program [https://perma.cc/QZ43-ATFD]. In November 2017, the 
DOJ announced that the Pilot Program would be made permanent and would 
be incorporated into the United States Attorney’s Manual as the Corporate 
Enforcement Policy. Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., Remarks at the 
34th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 
2017) (available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney- 
general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-international-conference-foreign 
[https://perma.cc/Z59X-GWYU]. The Corporate Enforcement Policy made 
certain changes to the terms of the Pilot Program that are actually more 
beneficial for companies. See Bill Steinman, Bill Steinman: What’s  New 
About the DOJ’s New FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy?, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 
1, 2017, 8:28 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/12/1/bill-steinman- 
whats-new-about-the-dojs-new-fcpa-corporate-en.html 
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difficult for companies to meet all of the policy’s vague 
requirements to the DOJ’s satisfaction.78 
The SEC also utilizes DPAs, NPAs, and declinations the way 
the DOJ does. However, it has some other resolution options at its 
disposal at well. The SEC can obtain a civil injunction through a 
court order.79 This was the traditional method for resolving FCPA 
cases, but the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd Frank) has led to an increase 
in FCPA cases being resolved in administrative courts before 
administrative law judges.80 This is because Dodd-Frank allows 
the SEC to impose civil penalties through administrative 
proceedings.81 
C. Fines and Penalties 
Although the statute provides limits for fines, total 
settlements in FCPA cases are continually increasing. For anti- 
bribery violations, the statutory limit on criminal fines for 
individuals is $250,000; companies may be subject to a fine of up 
to $2 million.82 For criminal accounting and record-keeping 
violations, individuals may be fined up to $5 million while 
companies may be fined up to $25 million.83 However, per the 
Alternative Fines Act, criminal fines may be increased to “double 
the gain or loss resulting from the corrupt payment.”84 This 
essentially means that “the statutory amounts are often of little 
importance in arriving at actual fine and penalty amounts in a 
 
 
[https://perma.cc/7APZ-XVGD]. 
78. See Mike Koehler, Grading the DOJ’s ‘FCPA Corporate Enforcement 
Policy’, BLOOMBERG L. WHITE COLLAR CRIME REP. 24 (2017). 
79. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 76. 
80. Gideon Mark, SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 45, 51–52 (2016). 
81. Id. at 46. 
82. STEIGER, supra note 9, at 153. Individuals may also be subject to a 
jail term of up to five years. Id. 
83. Id. Individuals may also be subject to a jail term of up to twenty 
years. Id. 
84. Id. “If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the 
offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, the 
defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or 
twice the gross loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would 
unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.” 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) 
(2012). 
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corporate FCPA enforcement action........ ”85 
The SEC now often also seeks disgorgement of profits,86  
which is in large part responsible for today’s substantial total 
settlement amounts.87 Disgorgement was not part of any 
settlement agreement until 2004 but since then it “has been used 
in the majority of cases and comprises the most significant part of 
the SEC’s recovery.”88 In 2016, disgorgement accounted for more 
than ninety-seven percent of the SEC’s total monetary recovery in 
FCPA enforcement actions—a total of $1.14 billion.89 
As mentioned above, FCPA fines and penalties almost always 
go to the U.S. Treasury general fund,90 which leads many to 
 
85. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 182. “In practice, Alternative Fines Act 
fines often exceed the statutory maximum fine in significant FCPA cases and 
enable the DOJ to secure nine-figure megafines.” TARUN, supra note 31, at  
19. 
86. David C. Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC 
Disgorgement of Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: 
Weighing Proportionality, Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
471, 478 (2009). 
87. Id. at 484. 
88. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 184. One commentator notes that the 
SEC’s use of disgorgement is troubling: it is not clear that Congress ever 
intended the SEC to seek disgorgement in FCPA cases, and there are 
practical difficulties in determining exactly how much money the company 
made as a result of the foreign bribery. Weiss, supra note 86, at 473–75. 
Furthermore, 
[t]he irony in many corporate FCPA enforcement actions is that the 
company is otherwise viewed as selling the best product or service 
for the best price. With such companies, can it truly be said that the 
alleged improper payments were the sole reason the company 
secured the contract or other benefit received? Does a but-for 
analysis have a place in arriving at FCPA fine and penalty amounts? 
In other words, should it be relevant that the company would likely 
have secured the contract or other benefit anyway, regardless of the 
improper payment? 
KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 183. Also, disgorgement in theory must be 
proportional to the offense, and given the difficulties in calculating the 
amount in foreign bribery cases, it is quite possible that a calculated amount 
might be disproportional, therefore constituting a punishment rather than an 
equitable remedy. Weiss, supra note 79, at 506. “[D]isgorgement is ill-suited 
to the foreign bribery context, in which some disgorgement calculations must 
necessarily resemble speculation or, at best, rough estimates.” Id. at 475. 
89. Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, Supreme Court’s Ruling on Disgorgement 
Has Broad Implications for FCPA Matters, FCPA UPDATE 2 (June 2017), 
https://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/ 
2017/06/fcpa_update_june_2017a.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GLJ-VR5J]. 
90. Scott C. Jansen, What Will $30 Million of the Rolls-Royce Fine Be 
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believe that FCPA enforcement is more about generating funds for 
the government rather than punishing and deterring corruption.91 
Former DOJ and SEC enforcement attorneys have made powerful 
statements on the subject. A former Assistant Director of the SEC 
Enforcement Division, who assisted in drafting the FCPA, wrote, 
“governments will keep pursuing corrupt business practices for 
one very simple reason—it’s lucrative.”92 Another former DOJ 
prosecutor stated, 
This is the one area of government activity that actually 
brings money in rather than shoots money out. We’re 
talking about literally billions of dollars that the 
government is able to collect . . . as long as there’s a 
budget issue it’s not too cynical to say that generating 
revenue is a factor in bringing these cases.93 
The DOJ’s former Assistant Chief for FCPA enforcement, 
William Jacobson, also said, “the government sees a profitable 
program, and it’s going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it 
anymore.”94 These statements potentially explain U.S. 
involvement in cases where jurisdictional ties are minimal and 
other countries with stronger ties have already initiated their own 
enforcement actions.95 
 
Used for?, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 10, 2017, 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/ 
blog/2017/2/10/what-will-30-million-of-the-rolls-royce-fine-be-used-for.html 
[https://perma.cc/ML83-PA9V]. 
91. KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 238; see also Matthew C. Turk, A Political 
Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 325, 346 (2013) (“Not only does enforcement generate positive 
revenue for the U.S. government, it also advantages domestic U.S. 
corporations that are less heavily investigated or punished relative to their 
foreign competitors.”). 
92. Michael F. Perlis & Wrenn E. Chais, Investigating the FCPA, FORBES 
(Dec. 8, 2009, 1:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/2009/12/08/foreign-corrupt- 
practices-act-opinions-contributors-michael-perlis-wrenn-chais.html#7403 
c2634e81 [https://perma.cc/Z2Z8-Y9VE]. 
93. Brian Mahoney, FCPA Enforcement Will Stay Robust Beyond 
Obama’s 2nd Term, LAW360 (Nov. 6, 2012, 12:00 AM), https://0-www.law360. 
com.lawlib.rwu.edu/articles/392138/fcpa-enforcement-will-stay-robust-beyond 
-obama-s-2nd-term. 
94. Turk, supra note 91, at 352. 
95. See KOEHLER, supra note 10, at 238–40. One commentator argues 
that U.S. enforcement agencies engage in “rent-seeking,” “in which every 
member of the FCPA enforcement apparatus benefits from expanding FCPA 
enforcement . . . .” Turk, supra note 91, at 354. Furthermore, “as rents 
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It is important to note that U.S. enforcement agencies in 
many cases do credit or offset fines and penalties paid to other 
countries’ enforcement agencies; this shows some recognition that 
it might be unfair for companies to face duplicative penalties for 
the same instance of foreign bribery.96 However, there is no 
guarantee that a company will receive a credit, and there is little 
insight into what U.S. enforcement agencies deem an appropriate 
amount to offset.97 Furthermore, duplicative penalties are only 
part of the problem for companies facing duplicative enforcement 
actions—there are also “burdens and costs” simply by virtue of 
being investigated by multiple enforcement agencies.98 Given the 
lack of information in FCPA settlement agreements and the lack 
of official guidance on the subject, it is difficult to know when and 
how much U.S. enforcement agencies will credit for penalties paid 
in other jurisdictions.99 
D. The FCPA’s Expansive Jurisdiction 
The FCPA gives the United States extremely broad 
jurisdiction to prosecute foreign bribery, which causes even more 
of a compliance concern for companies and individuals.100 The 
FCPA provides three bases for jurisdiction.101 First, as explained 
above, the FCPA covers “issuers,” which essentially include 
publicly traded companies and any other companies that are 
 
become a more important governmental objective, more resources are 
invested in detection and punishment [of crimes that produce rents].” Id. at 
361 (citing Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, Optimal Law Enforcement with 
a Rent-Seeking Government, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 128 (2002)). He 
proposes diverting disgorgement away from the SEC to reduce the 
enforcement agencies’ incentive to prosecute “lower-hanging fruit” and 
encourage focus on cases with “clearer factual and legal bases.” Id. at 363.  
He suggests international organizations or demand-side countries (with 
conditions) as potential recipients of disgorgement. Id. at 366–67. 
96. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 506–07. 
97. Id. at 507. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 507–08. “[W]ithout more visibility into the U.S. settlement 
process, or additional guidance from U.S. regulators, it is difficult to infer 
anything certain about the SEC’s or DOJ’s policies with respect to U.S. 
treatment of foreign antibribery settlements.” Id. 
100. See Natasha N. Wilson, Note, Pushing the Limits of Jurisdiction Over 
Foreign Actors Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1063, 1070–71 (2014). 
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-3. 
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required to file with the SEC.102 The accounting and 
recordkeeping provisions and the internal controls provision of the 
FCPA only apply to issuers.103 Officers, directors, agents, 
employees, and stockholders of an issuer are also covered by the 
FCPA.104 
Second, the FCPA covers “domestic concerns.”105 Domestic 
concerns include United States citizens, nationals, and residents, 
as well as any type of business entity that has its principal place 
of business in the United States or is organized under United 
States law.106 Like with issuers, the FCPA also covers the  
officers, directors, agents, employees, and stockholders of domestic 
concerns.107 It is important to note that a United States citizen, 
national, or resident need not be physically present in the United 
States for the FCPA to apply.108 
The first two bases for jurisdiction were part of the FCPA as 
originally enacted in 1977.109 The 1998 amendments added  a 
third jurisdictional basis—territorial jurisdiction.110 Essentially, 
anyone who does any “act in furtherance” of a bribe, or an offer to 
bribe, “while in the territory of the United States” is subject to the 
FCPA, even if they are not an  issuer or a domestic concern.111  
The enforcement agencies have taken an aggressive stance on 
what “while in the territory of the United States” actually 
means.112 For example, the enforcement agencies would consider 
 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1; TARUN, supra note 31, at 45. 
103. DEMING, supra note 8, at 42. 
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. 
105.    15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. 
106. Id. United States law includes state or federal law, as well as the law 
of any territory, possession, or commonwealth. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See id. 
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-2; FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, 
at 10. 
110. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3; FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 38, at 11. 
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). 
112. See Sean Hecker & Margot Laporte, Should FCPA “Territorial” 
Jurisdiction Reach Extraterritorial Proportions?, 42 A.B.A. INT’L L. NEWS 1, 
7–8 (2013); Wilson, supra note 100, at 1071. 
“Within” has a particular meaning in this context: to commit an act 
“within” the territory actually means causing an act to be committed 
within the territory. The 1998 amendment thus established 
jurisdiction over anyone who uses the mails, means, or 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce in the United States to 
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the sending of emails via U.S.-based servers, or the use of the U.S. 
banking system by facilitating bribes in U.S. dollars, as giving the 
United States jurisdiction over the bribery.113 Given that 
companies almost always settle, the enforcement agencies’ 
interpretation of territorial jurisdiction has rarely been 
challenged.114 
In originally enacting the FCPA, Congress excluded from 
jurisdictional reach foreign individuals and companies, provided 
they were not issuers or domestic concerns.115 It did so out of 
concerns about sovereignty issues, foreign policy and diplomatic 
relations, and the potential for reciprocal  prosecution.116 
However, in 1998, the Senate ratified the OECD Convention, 
which requires its signatories to criminalize foreign bribery and 
specifically calls for an expansive jurisdictional scope.117 In fact, 
the official OECD Commentaries to the Convention state that 
“[t]he territorial basis for jurisdiction should be interpreted 
broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act 
is not required.”118 To comply with the OECD Convention, 
 
 
facilitate an FCPA violation, even if that person was not physically 
present in the United States when acting or otherwise subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction as a citizen or issuer. 
Wilson, supra note 100, at 1071. 
113. See Hecker, supra note 112, at 8; Wilson, supra note 100, at 1071–72. 
When banks wish to transact in a location where they do not have a 
branch, they can use a correspondent account in that location to 
conduct transactions, such as receiving deposits or making 
payments. Foreign banks use U.S. correspondent accounts to 
facilitate U.S. dollar transactions . . . . In recent  enforcement 
actions, the DOJ and SEC have signaled that the use of U.S. 
correspondent accounts can establish jurisdiction over the foreign 
actor conducting the transaction, even when that correspondent 
account is the actor’s only link to the United States. 
Wilson, supra note 100, at 1072. 
114. Hecker, supra note 112, at 8, 10; Wilson, supra note 100, at 1072–73. 
115. See Wilson, supra note 100, at 1070. 
116. Id. 
117. TARUN, supra note 31, at 45; OECD Convention, supra note 4, at art. 
4 ¶ 1. “Each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish 
its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is 
committed in whole or in part in its territory.” OECD Convention, supra note 
4, at art. 4 ¶ 1. 
118. Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development, 
Commentaries on the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions 25 (1997), available at 
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Congress amended the FCPA that same year and broadened the 
jurisdictional scope to include foreign corporations and foreign 
individuals that bribe, or offer to bribe, foreign officials while “in” 
the United States.119 The fact that the United States and all of  
the other OECD Convention signatories have statutes conferring 
such broad jurisdiction to prosecute foreign bribery cases creates 
overlapping jurisdiction that leads to duplicative enforcement 
actions. 
II. OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION AND MULTIJURISDICTIONAL 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
Foreign bribery cases by nature involve multiple countries, 
and given that the United States and other countries assert 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in these cases, there is almost always 
overlapping jurisdiction.120 As a result, companies may be subject 
to prosecution by multiple countries’ enforcement agencies.121 
Unfortunately for companies accused of FCPA violations, the 
United States constitutional protection against “double jeopardy” 
does not apply in cases involving multiple sovereigns; if the 
conduct constitutes a criminal offense in the United States, and 
also constitutes a criminal offense in another country, then the 
conduct is considered to be a separate violation of law in each 
country, even though the violations arose from the same 
underlying facts.122 
In many instances, the United States does have jurisdiction, 
but given that the other countries involved in the enforcement 
action have much stronger ties to the case, there is no obvious 
public policy reason for the United States to be so heavily 
involved. While it is very possible that U.S. enforcement agencies 
do, in fact, have good policy reasons for their involvement, and for 
the portion of penalties they take in these cases, those reasons are 
not made clear to the public.123 From the four multijurisdictional 
 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. 
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–3(a); TARUN, supra note 31, at 45. 
120. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 496. 
121. Id. 
122. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1322. 
123. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 510. 
It is unclear how U.S. and foreign authorities . . . decide who takes 
the lead on an investigation .......... [T]he coordination and division of 
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enforcement actions in 2017, it is difficult to discern any patterns 
regarding (1) what the United States considers to be a strong tie 
to the case, and (2) what portion of total penalties the United 
States takes.124 
A. Overlapping Jurisdiction as a Result of the OECD Convention 
When Congress enacted the FCPA, the United States was the 
only country in the world that criminalized bribery of foreign 
officials, and as a result, U.S. companies were arguably at a 
disadvantage when competing for business in the international 
market.125 In amending the FCPA in 1988, Congress expressly 
called for the President to negotiate an international agreement 
among OECD countries in order to level the playing field in 
international business transactions.126 After many years of 
diplomatic efforts, the OECD Convention was finalized on 
December 17, 1997, requiring all signatories to enact domestic 
legislation that criminalized foreign bribery.127 Currently, forty- 
three countries have ratified the OECD Convention and have 
 
 
penalties may be a result of horse trading or comity as multiple 
regulators that have invested significant resources into the 
investigation seek to obtain something to show for it. 
Id. The International Foreign Bribery Taskforce (IFBT) is comprised of 
law enforcement agencies from the United States, Canada, Australia, 
and the United Kingdom, and representatives from those agencies have 
stated that in multijurisdictional matters, “the agencies will informally 
assign one organization among them to take the leading role in each 
multi-jurisdictional investigation. This decision is based not only where 
the misconduct has occurred or the situs of most of the evidence, but also 
where they’re likely to secure the largest penalty.” Bill Steinman, Bill 
Steinman: It’s Time to Meet the International Foreign Bribery Taskforce, 
FCPA BLOG (Dec. 7, 2016, 8:22 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/ 
12/7/bill-steinman-its-time-to-meet-the-international-foreign-bri.html 
[https://perma.cc/C9TD-R43S]. 
124. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 513. 
Identifying patterns and trends . . . can be difficult, and observers 
and practitioners may often be reduced to reading proverbial 
tealeaves in an attempt to map out the landscape . . . Companies . . . 
may be hard pressed to draw neat conclusions from . . . case studies 
that, ultimately, provide too little consistency and predictability. 
Id. 
125. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1325. 
126. Id. 
127. TARUN, supra note 31, at 55. 
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implemented foreign bribery legislation.128 
Interestingly, Article 4 of the OECD Convention, which 
addresses jurisdiction, requires signatories to establish 
jurisdiction when the foreign bribery offense takes place either in 
whole or in part within that territory.129 This essentially 
guarantees that there will be overlapping jurisdiction in foreign 
bribery cases, given that, by nature, foreign bribery takes place in 
at least two countries—the country from which the bribe is made, 
known as the supply-side country, and the country of the official 
who accepts the bribe, known as the demand-side country.130 
Furthermore, if a company has foreign subsidiaries that are 
involved in the bribery, the country where that subsidiary is 
located will also likely have jurisdiction.131 Article 4 also requires 
that signatory countries, consistent with their own laws, establish 
jurisdiction when its nationals commit foreign bribery offenses 
while outside that country; therefore, the home country of any 
employee or third-party agent involved in the bribery will also 
likely have jurisdiction in a single case.132 
B. Trends, or Lack Thereof, in Recent Multijurisdictional 
Enforcement Actions 
Although the United States is still the primary enforcer of 
foreign bribery violations, it is no longer the only game in town.  
In 2017, there were 266 foreign bribery investigations conducted 
worldwide.133 The United States by itself was responsible for 
forty-three percent of all investigations; the United Kingdom, with 
the second largest number of investigations, was responsible for 
sixteen percent.134 Despite the fact that the United States 
 
 
128. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions, Ratification Status as of May 2017, 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/WGBRatificationStatus.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6BPJ-6GPC]. 
129. OECD Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4 ¶ 1. 
130. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 496. 
131. Id. 
132. OECD Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4 ¶ 2; Holtmeier, supra note 
17, at 496; Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1326. 
133. TRACE International, Inc., Global Enforcement Report 2017, 6 (Mar. 
2018), https://traceinternational.org/Uploads/PublicationFiles/GER2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KRQ5-E7TJ]. 
134. Id. However, enforcement actions brought by European countries, 
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conducted nearly half of the total investigations, it was one of 
thirty countries that conducted foreign bribery investigations in 
2017.135 As more countries begin to enforce their anti-bribery 
laws, there likely will be an increase in the number of 
multijurisdictional enforcement actions. 
The United States participated in four multijurisdictional 
enforcement actions in 2017.136 Examining the jurisdictional ties 
in each case, and the portion of each total settlement the U.S. took 
in comparison to the other countries involved, it is difficult to  
come to any conclusions about U.S. enforcement policy.  
Companies will likely have difficulty predicting the outcome when 
faced with investigations by multiple countries’ enforcement 
agencies. This is not only unfair to companies, but also 
discourages them from voluntarily disclosing any violations, which 
is ultimately counterproductive to the goals of anti-bribery 
laws.137 
1. Telia Company AB 
In September 2017, Telia Company AB (Telia), a Swedish 
telecommunications company, agreed to pay more than $965 
million to resolve foreign bribery charges.138 Telia was accused of 
having made corrupt payments to Gulnara Karimova (Karimova), 
the eldest daughter of the President of Uzbekistan, from 2007 to 
at  least 2010.139    According to the  SEC, Telia  made  more   than 
$330 million in improper payments to Karimova, and Karimova 
helped   Telia   generate  more   than  $2.5  billion  in  revenues.140 
 
 
when counted together, were responsible for forty-four percent. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. See discussion infra sections II.B.1–4. 
137. Holtmeier, supra note 17, at 515–16. 
138. Press Release, supra note 1. 
139. Ryan Rohlfsen, G. David Rojas & Kendall Scott, In the Third-Largest 
FCPA Enforcement Action Ever, Telia Agrees to Pay Almost $1 Billion to 
Resolve Bribery Inquiry in Uzbekistan; CEO, Senior Executive, and In-House 
Counsel Also Charged, ROPES     &   GRAY    ALERT (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/alerts/2017/09/20170922_AC_Alert. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/8T6J-87VQ]; Richard L. Cassin, Telia Disgorges $457 
Million to SEC, Agrees to $965 Million in Total Penalties for FCPA Offenses, 
FCPA BLOG (Sept. 21, 2017, 1:28 PM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2017/9/ 
21/telia-disgorges-457-million-to-sec-agrees-to-965-million-in.html 
[https://perma.cc/T4E3-6WWC]. 
140. Telia Co. AB, No. 3-18195 (U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Sept. 21, 2017) 
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Specifically, Karimova helped Telia acquire COSCOM LLC, a 
telecommunications company that had operations in Uzbekistan; 
assisted with obtaining necessary licenses to operate a 3G, and 
later 4G, network; and improperly influenced other government 
officials in order to help COSCOM acquire the additional phone 
numbers it needed to gain more subscribers.141 
Though the United States did have jurisdiction over the 
misconduct, its connection to the bribery was minimal. Telia’s 
shares were traded on the NASDAQ from 2002 through 
September 5, 2007, so it was an issuer during that period.142 
However, it is not clear how much overlap there was when Telia 
was a United States issuer and when the bribery was taking 
place.143 The United States also based jurisdiction on  the  fact 
that most of the improper transactions were made in U.S. dollars, 
and that communications with Karimova were made, in part, via 
e-mail accounts on U.S.-based servers.144 
The other two countries involved in the enforcement action 
were Sweden and the Netherlands. Sweden is where Telia is 
incorporated, while three of Telia’s subsidiaries related to its 
business in Eurasia were formed in the Netherlands.145 Clearly, 
those two countries had a stronger connection to the case than did 
the United States, but still the United States ended up with 
hundreds of millions of dollars for the U.S. Treasury general fund. 
In its resolution with the DOJ, Telia agreed to pay a $500,000 
criminal fine; $40 million as forfeiture, part of COSCOM’s guilty 
plea; and a criminal penalty of approximately $234 million.146 
 
 
[hereinafter Telia Cease-and-Desist Order], https://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
admin/2017/34-81669.pdf. 
141. Id. at 3–7. 
142. Id. at 2. 
143. Rohlfsen, Rojas & Scott, supra note 139. 
144. Telia Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 140, at 2. 
145. Id. at 2–3. Fintur Holdings B.V. “is a majority-owned subsidiary of 
Telia and acts as a manager and holding company for many of the [sic] Telia’s 
operating companies in the Eurasia business unit.” Id. at 3. TeliaSonera  
UTA Holding B.V. “is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Telia and acts as one of 
two intermediate holding companies of COSCOM.” Id. at 3. TeliaSonera 
Uzbek Telecom Holding B.V. “is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Telia and acts 
as one of two intermediate holding companies of COSCOM.” Id. 
146. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 8, United States v. Telia Co. AB, 
No. 17-CR-581-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao- 
sdny/press-release/file/997851/download [https://perma.cc/UNX9-BRGL]. 
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Two hundred and seventy-four million dollars was to be paid to 
the Dutch authorities for a potential prosecution in the 
Netherlands, and if the Dutch penalty were to end up being less 
than $274 million, the difference would be due to the U.S. 
Treasury.147 In criminal penalties, the United States put 
approximately $274.6 million, and possibly more, into the U.S. 
Treasury for a case of foreign bribery in which the only ties to the 
United States were some transactions made in U.S. dollars and 
some emails sent from U.S. servers. The United States took more 
than half of the total criminal penalties, despite the fact that the 
Netherlands’ ties to the case were far more direct. 
The SEC brought its own enforcement action against Telia, 
requiring Telia to disgorge hundreds of millions of dollars in 
profits.148 The SEC credited Telia for the $40 million forfeiture as 
part of the DOJ resolution, but still required Telia to pay $208.5 
million to the U.S. Treasury, and $208.5 million to the Swedish 
and Dutch authorities.149 If the amounts paid to those authorities 
were to end up being less than $208.5 million, the difference 
would be due to the U.S. Treasury.150 Again, despite Sweden and 
the Netherlands having much stronger ties to the case, the United 
States collected more than half of the disgorged profits. The 
United States, while technically having jurisdiction, had very 
little actual connection to the bribery and yet collected more than 
$483 million total from the DOJ and SEC resolutions. While some 
might argue that the United States has an interest in protecting 
its capital markets and financial institutions, is it enough of a 
policy interest to justify these duplicative and excessive penalties? 
2. SBM Offshore N.V. 
In November 2017, SBM Offshore N.V. (SBM), a Dutch oil 
and gas drilling equipment company, entered into a DPA with the 
DOJ to resolve foreign bribery charges.151 Between roughly 1996 
 
147. Id. at 8–9. 
148. Telia Cease-and-Desist Order, supra note 140, at 8. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, SBM Offshore N.V. And United 
States-Based Subsidiary Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case 
Involving Bribes in Five Countries (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/sbm-offshore-nv-and-united-states-based- 
subsidiary-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-case [https://perma.cc/Q9XZ- 
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and 2012, SBM engaged in systematic bribery, with illicit 
payments made at multiple levels of the company, and the 
payments themselves taking many different forms.152 SBM 
executives facilitated commission payments to third-party agents, 
knowing that part of those payments would be used to bribe 
officials in numerous countries, including Brazil, Angola, 
Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, and Iraq, to “secur[e] improper 
advantages and obtain[] and retain[] business” with state-owned 
oil companies in those countries.153 SBM either “earned or 
expected to earn at least $2.8 billion” as a result of advantages 
from the improper payments.154 SBM also sent foreign officials 
“thank you” payments after being awarded business.155 
Furthermore, SBM authorized some of its employees to make 
smaller improper payments in kind to foreign officials in the form 
of jewelry and electronics, and paid for foreign officials to take 
trips to attend sporting events, while also providing them with 
“spending money.”156 SBM also covered “tuition and living 
expenses” for the relatives of foreign officials and employed 
relatives of foreign officials.157 
The U.S. jurisdictional connection to the case was SBM’s 
Houston-based subsidiaries—domestic concerns for FCPA 
purposes as companies incorporated in the United States.158 Also, 
one of the SBM executives who “managed a significant portion of 
the corrupt scheme” and “engaged in conduct within the 
jurisdiction of the United States” was a U.S. citizen and therefore 
also a domestic concern under the FCPA.159 Furthermore, the 
“commission payments” made to one of the intermediaries, for the 
purpose of facilitating bribes to Brazilian officials, were made to a 
U.S. bank account.160 
 
 
8EJ9]. 
152. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at A-7 to A-9, United States v. SBM 
Offshore N.V., No. 17-686 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/press-release/file/1014801/download [https://perma.cc/HRU3-WNSB]. 
153. Id. at A-7. 
154. Id. at A-7 to A-8. 
155. Id. at A-8. 
156. Id. at A-8 to A-9. 
157. Id. at A-9. 
158. Id. at A-1 to A-2. 
159. Id. at A-4 to A-5. 
160. Id. at A-10. 
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In the U.S. enforcement action, SBM paid a total criminal 
penalty of $238 million—$500,000 of which was a criminal fine 
and $13.2 million of which was a forfeiture by SBM on behalf of its 
U.S. subsidiary, which pleaded guilty to FCPA charges.161 The 
DOJ credited SBM for the money already paid to the 
Netherlands—a $40 million fine and $200 million disgorgement— 
and for the predicted amount SBM would have to pay to resolve 
charges in Brazil.162 In addition to crediting for penalties paid in 
other jurisdictions, the DOJ also tried to impose a penalty that 
would avoid “substantially jeopardiz[ing] the continued viability of 
the Company . . . .”163 Despite those considerations, the  
settlement money paid to the United States was nearly equivalent 
to the penalties paid to the Netherlands, which is where SBM is 
headquartered and publicly traded.164 The DOJ acknowledged  
this in the DPA: “[E]ven though the Offices are crediting the full 
amount paid in fines and forfeiture to the Dutch authorities in 
connection with the Dutch resolution, the penalty owed in the 
United States exceeds the amount paid to the Dutch 
authorities.”165 
In the SBM enforcement action, the country where the 
company was publicly traded—the Netherlands—required the 
disgorgement of profits. In the Telia enforcement action, the 
United States required the disgorgement of profits, despite the 
fact that Telia was publicly traded in Sweden. The U.S. 
enforcement agencies did not make publicly clear why the 
disgorgement was paid to the United States in one case but not in 
the other. Furthermore, in both cases, the United States took half 
of the total payment, even though the Netherlands had a stronger 
connection to the case. 
3. Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd. 
In December 2017, Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd. (Keppel) 
 
 
161. Id. at 12. 
162. Id. at 13. 
163. Id. at 7. 
164. Id. at 12-13, A-1. 
165. Id. at 5. It is likely that the DPA states that the penalties “exceed” 
those paid to the Netherlands because technically the penalty paid to the 
Netherlands was only $40 million—the disgorgement is not considered a 
penalty. 
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entered into a DPA with the DOJ to resolve charges that it had 
bribed officials in Brazil.166 Keppel is a Singapore-based company 
and the world’s largest builder of oil rigs.167 From around 2001 to 
2014, Keppel paid approximately $55 million in bribes to officials 
in Brazil to obtain and retain business commissioned by 
Petrobras, a Brazilian state-owned oil company.168 Keppel made 
more than $350 million in profits from the business it won in 
Brazil in connection with the bribery scheme; the DPA states that 
some of the profits were made by Keppel’s U.S. subsidiary, KOM 
USA.169 
That subsidiary was the U.S. jurisdictional connection to the 
case, as it had entered into some of the “consulting agreements” 
that facilitated the bribes.170 Keppel also made some of the 
“consulting payments” to bank accounts in the United States, 
 
 
166. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Keppel Offshore & Marine Ltd. and 
U.S. Based Subsidiary Agree to Pay $422 Million in Global Penalties to 
Resolve Foreign Bribery Case. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/keppel-offshore-marine-ltd-and-us-based-subsidiary-agree- 
pay-422-million-global-penalties [https://perma.cc/536P-MSEF]. 
167. Id.; Christie Smythe, Keppel Offshore to Pay $422 Million to End 
Bribery Probe, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2017, 7:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg. 
com/news/articles/2017-12-22/keppel-offshore-agrees-to-pay-422-million-to- 
end-bribe-probe. 
168. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at A-5, United States v. Keppel 
Offshore & Marine Ltd., No. 17-CR-697 (KAM) (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1020706/download 
[https://perma.cc/BBD5-WSAX] [hereinafter Keppel   DPA]. Brazilian 
prosecutors launched an investigation in March 2014 known as Operacao 
Lava Jato, or Operation Car Wash, which uncovered a bribery scheme in 
which executives at Petrobras, and the politicians who appointed those 
executives, accepted bribes to manipulate construction contract bids. Claire 
Felter & Rocio Cara Labrador, Brazil’s Corruption Fallout, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/brazils- 
corruption-fallout [https://perma.cc/6DJF-DTNS]; Celso Barros, The Twilight 
of Brazil’s Anti-Corruption Movement, THE ATLANTIC (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/temer-lula- 
rousseff-brazil-operation-carwash-corruption/535029/ [https://perma.cc/45RA- 
4LMH]. As of October 2018, Operation Car Wash has resulted in over 200 
convictions for various crimes. Felter & Cara Labrador, supra note 168.  
Many politicians, including four former presidents of Brazil, have been 
investigated; former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, referred to as the 
mastermind behind the corruption scheme, was sentenced in May 2017 to 
more than nine years in prison. Id. 
169. Keppel DPA, supra note 168, at A-5. 
170. Id. 
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which the consultants then transferred out of the country.171 
The DOJ determined that Keppel’s total criminal penalty 
should be approximately $422 million but that only twenty-five 
percent of that total should be paid to the U.S. Treasury.172 The 
DOJ credited the amounts Keppel would have to pay to the 
Brazilian and Singaporean authorities—approximately $211 
million and $105.5 million respectively.173 However, should the 
payments to the Brazilian and Singaporean authorities be less 
than those amounts, the difference would be due to U.S. 
Treasury.174 The DOJ took the same approach in the Telia 
enforcement action, where if penalties paid to the Dutch and 
Swedish authorities were less than what the United States 
designated, the difference would be due to the U.S. Treasury. 
Keppel is notable because both the supply-side country and 
demand-side country brought enforcement actions. In other  
words, a Singapore-based company supplied the bribes to 
Brazilian officials and both Singapore and Brazil were involved in 
enforcement. In Telia, the demand-side country, Uzbekistan, was 
not involved; in SBM, Brazil was one of the demand-side countries 
and did bring an enforcement action, but there were at least four 
other demand-side countries that did not bring enforcement 
actions. Given that the two countries with the strongest ties to  
the case brought enforcement actions in Keppel’s case, it is 
unclear what the U.S. policy interest was in bringing its own 
action, and for taking such a large portion of the total global 
criminal penalty. One commentator questioned whether this was 
“piling on” by the United States: 
Sure, the DOJ did credit amounts paid in connection with 
the Singapore and Brazil enforcement actions, but is this 
an instance in which the DOJ should simply have stepped 
back? What is the policy interest (other than perhaps 
filling U.S. Treasury coffers) in bringing an FCPA 
enforcement action against a Singapore company for 
allegedly bribing Brazilian officials when Singapore and 
Brazil also brought enforcement actions based on the 
 
 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 8–9. 
173. Id. at 9. 
174. Id. 
 2019] FCPA ENFORCEMENT 197 
 
same conduct?175 
In a way, Keppel looks like a step in the right direction 
because the United States only took a quarter of the total criminal 
penalty instead of half, like it did in Telia and SBM.  
Furthermore, one could argue that the U.S. subsidiary’s 
involvement actually makes a stronger case for U.S. enforcement. 
However, if a company is already facing punishment by two other 
countries, especially both the supply-side and the demand-side 
countries, what effect does U.S. involvement really have? Are the 
duplicative penalties really advancing a U.S. policy interest? 
4. Rolls-Royce plc 
In January 2017, Rolls-Royce plc (Rolls-Royce) entered into a 
DPA with the DOJ to resolve charges of FCPA violations.176 Rolls-
Royce, a U.K.-based company, manufactures and distributes 
“power systems for the aerospace, defense, marine and energy 
sectors.”177 From around 2000 to around 2013, Rolls-Royce’s 
United States subsidiary, RRESI, made “over $35 million in 
commission payments” to third-party agents, “knowing that 
[those] payments would be used to bribe foreign officials on behalf 
of Rolls-Royce and RRESI . . . .”178 The demand-side countries 
included Thailand, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Angola, and 
Iraq.179 
Interestingly, the United States seemed to have a fairly 
strong connection to this case, despite the portion of the total 
 
175. Issues to Consider From the Keppel Offshore & Marine Enforcement 
Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 26, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/issues- 
consider-keppel-offshore-marine-enforcement-action/ [https://perma.cc/99BF- 
VGDD]. 
176. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Rolls-Royce plc Agrees to Pay $170 
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case (Jan. 
17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rolls-royce-plc-agrees-pay-170- 
million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act 
[https://perma.cc/X26J-MAR4]). The Rolls-Royce enforcement action was 
concluded at the end of the Obama administration; Telia, Keppel, and SBM 
were concluded during the Trump administration. 
177. Id. 
178. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at A-5, United States v. Rolls-Royce 
plc, 16-cr-247 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press- 
release/file/927221/download [https://perma.cc/GBT4-2RXU] [hereinafter 
Rolls-Royce U.S. DPA]. 
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penalties it took, as discussed below. RRESI was a domestic 
concern under the FCPA and two of the employees involved in the 
bribery scheme were United States citizens, and therefore also 
domestic concerns.180 Furthermore, RRESI engaged all five 
intermediaries that then bribed government officials in each of the 
demand-side countries named above.181 
Rolls-Royce agreed to pay a U.S. penalty of nearly $170 
million.182 That amount reflected a credit for the penalties Rolls- 
Royce paid to the Brazilian authorities—approximately $25 
million.183 Rolls-Royce also entered into a DPA with the U.K.’s 
Serious Fraud Office (SFO) for paying bribes in connection with  
its business in China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Russia, 
and  Thailand.184    The  United  States  DPA  did  not  mention the 
U.K. DPA, likely because the demand-side countries in each did 
not overlap, with the exception of Thailand. The total U.K. 
payment Rolls-Royce agreed to was approximately £487 million 
(approximately $605 million).185 Approximately £58 million 
(approximately $72 million) of that was disgorgement and 
approximately £239 million (approximately $296 million) was a 
financial penalty.186 Rolls-Royce also agreed to reimburse the  
SFO for the costs of the investigation—£13 million (approximately 
$16 million).187 
Rolls-Royce paid approximately $800 million total to the three 
countries involved in enforcement, but the United States took less 
than a quarter of that.188 The United States subsidiary seemed to 
be heavily involved in the bribery scheme, and most of the conduct 
 
 
180. Id. at A-1 to A-2. 
181. Id. at A-2 to A-3. 
182. Id. at 9. Thirty million dollars of the total U.S. penalty was to be  
paid to the Consumer Financial Fraud Fund; generally penalties and 
disgorgement are paid to the U.S. Treasury general fund. It is  unclear why 
in this case part of the penalty was earmarked. Jansen, supra note 90. 
183. Rolls-Royce U.S. DPA, supra note 178, at 9. 
184. Press Release, supra note 176. 
185. Id. 
186. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, R. v. Rolls-Royce plc (Jan. 17, 
2017), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/rolls-royce-plc/ [https://perma.cc/9X7P- 
S4H3] (last visited Sept. 30, 2018). 
187. Id. at 4. Unlike the United States, which generally requires payment 
within ten days, the United Kingdom allowed Rolls-Royce to pay in four 
installments, plus any interest. See id. at 4. 
188. See Press Release, supra, note 176. 
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covered by the U.K. DPA did not overlap. It is hard to reconcile 
the U.S. involvement in this case with its involvement in Telia.189 
III. TIME FOR A POLICY OF SELF-RESTRAINT AND TRANSPARENCY IN 
MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS? 
There is nothing that legally prevents the United States from 
bringing its own actions in multijurisdictional anti-bribery cases, 
but it would be good public policy for the United States to show 
self-restraint in these cases, as well as greater transparency in its 
approach to penalties. A strict double jeopardy rule would not 
make sense in FCPA cases because perhaps not all countries 
prosecute anti-bribery cases as they should. However, U.S. 
enforcement agencies might step back when the problem has been 
reasonably addressed by other countries. The OECD Convention 
and the DOJ’s “Petite Policy,” regarding state-federal successive 
prosecutions, support adopting a policy of self-restraint and 
transparency in multijurisdictional enforcement actions.190 While 
the DOJ’s new policy against “piling on” is a step in the right 
direction, the policy is vague and still does not give companies any 
practical sense of when the DOJ will seek duplicative penalties.191 
Furthermore, the SEC does not have an equivalent policy. Time 
will tell if the new DOJ policy will create real predictability in 
multijurisdictional enforcement actions. 
A. The OECD Convention Addresses Overlapping Jurisdiction, 
but Does Not Provide a Binding Mechanism 
Article 4.3 of the OECD Convention addresses the 
 
 
189. It may be because the U.K. Bribery Act is a very strong anti-bribery 
statute and the U.K. has started to enforce anti-bribery violations 
aggressively. Steiger, supra note 9, at 160–61 (“[T]he new British statute has 
been hailed as  ‘the  toughest anti-corruption legislation  in the  world.’”). The 
U.K. Bribery Act has “ambitious” jurisdictional reach—if a company has a 
presence in the United Kingdom, even if not the headquarters, the U.K. has 
jurisdiction over any of that company’s foreign bribery violations, regardless 
of whether the bribery took place in the U.K. or was related to U.K. 
operations. Id. at 162 (“[I]f a U.S. company has a U.K. presence and engages 
in prohibited acts in Asia, it could be prosecuted in the U.K. pursuant to the 
Act.”). 
190. See Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1342–44, 1350 n.184. 
191. Rosenstein, supra note 27. The “piling on” policy is discussed in  
detail in subsection C below. 
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inevitability of overlapping jurisdiction in foreign bribery cases.192 
It states that “[w]hen more than one Party has jurisdiction over  
an alleged offense described in this Convention, the Parties 
involved shall, at the request of one of them, consult with a view  
to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
prosecution.”193 The use of the word “shall” seems to require the 
parties to work together and devise a plan to ensure that the 
company or individual in question is not subject to multiple 
enforcement   actions.194 Furthermore, the phrase “most 
appropriate jurisdiction” seems to indicate that only one country 
should prosecute.195 
However, the way Article 4.3 is written indicates that the 
obligations are only triggered when one country requests a 
consultation.196 As one commentator notes, “[w]e may easily 
dispense with the possibility that Article 4, paragraph 3 alone 
creates a self-executing protection against double jeopardy.”197 
The Fifth Circuit has also considered the meaning of Article 4.3 
and concluded that the obligation to consult depends on one of the 
countries formally requesting it.198 Unfortunately, there is 
nothing in the official commentaries about this section, but 
commentators have speculated about the drafters’  intent.199 
“[T]he OECD Convention appears to envision a single prosecution 
for cases of foreign bribery, [although] it certainly does not 
advocate or insist upon that in every instance . . . .”200 “The 
 
192. See OECD Convention, supra note 4, at art. 4 ¶ 3. “The OECD 
Convention clearly considered the possibility of multiple investigations.” 
Davis, supra note 22, at 62. 
193. OECD Convention, supra note 4, art. 4 ¶ 3. 
194. See Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1344. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. “Having recognized the conditions that create a risk of multiple 
investigations, the Convention provided for no legally enforceable ban on 
multiple prosecutions . . . .” Davis, supra note 22, at 62. 
197. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1344. 
198. Id. at 1344–45 (referring to United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706, 711 
(5th Cir. 2010)). In Jeong, a South Korean individual was convicted and 
sentenced in South Korea for bribing American public officials, and then 
indicted for the same conduct in the United States. See id. The court held 
that Article 4.3 of the OECD Convention did not bar the U.S. action against 
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request for consultation. See id. (citing Jeong, 624 F.3d at 711). 
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drafters clearly hoped that in the event of multiple investigations, 
only one country would actually prosecute a given defendant.”201 
It is therefore unclear what the effect of Article 4.3 really is.  
It seems to mandate a single prosecution only in instances where 
countries want that outcome, and even that is not entirely certain. 
The Fifth Circuit, in dicta, interpreted the language of Article 
4.3—“the Parties involved shall, at the request of one of them, 
consult with a view to determining the most appropriate 
jurisdiction”—to mean that determining “the most appropriate 
jurisdiction for prosecution” is only a goal.202 However, it is odd 
that the drafters would specifically address multijurisdictional 
enforcement actions, particularly in a treaty with very few 
provisions, and then provide a mechanism that essentially has no 
teeth.203 The drafters seemed to anticipate the likelihood of 
duplicative enforcement actions and the unfairness those 
duplicative enforcement actions would create for companies. Each 
country may have legitimate policy reasons for bringing its own 
action, so a strict double jeopardy provision may not be the best 
solution, but perhaps the spirit of Article 4.3 should be 
incorporated into the U.S. approach to multijurisdictional 
enforcement actions.204 
B. The “Petite Policy” Regarding State-Federal Successive 
Prosecutions 
The U.S. Constitution protects criminal defendants against 
double jeopardy—one cannot be “prosecuted or sentenced twice for 
substantially the same offense.”205 However, U.S. protection 
against double jeopardy is limited to successive prosecutions by a 
 
 
201. Davis, supra note 22, at 62. 
202. Van Alstine, supra note 18, at 1346 (emphasis added) (citing Jeong, 
624 F.3d at 711). 
203. See id. at 1326; see also Davis, supra note 22, at 62. 
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against double jeopardy, see Alistair Craig, OECD Should Protect Against 
Multi-Country Enforcement, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 11, 2013, 3:58 AM), http:// 
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as ne bis in idem. Davis, supra note 22, at 58. 
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single sovereign.206 In other words, the federal government  
cannot prosecute someone twice for the same offense; likewise, an 
individual state cannot prosecute someone multiple times for the 
same offense.207 However, the federal government can prosecute 
someone already prosecuted by a state, and a state can prosecute 
someone already prosecuted by the federal government.208 The 
theory is that sovereigns have the right to enforce their own laws 
and that “each sovereign’s laws address different interests.”209 
This applies in the international context as well, because 
individual countries are, of course, independent sovereigns.210 
Therefore, in FCPA cases, double jeopardy will not protect a 
company facing enforcement actions by multiple countries: foreign 
prosecution will not bar the United States from bringing its own 
action.211 
Despite the fact that there is no constitutional protection 
against successive prosecutions by both a state and the federal 
government, the DOJ has its own internal policy against bringing 
these actions and this policy could be adapted to apply to foreign 
prosecutions in FCPA cases.212 Known formally as the “Dual and 
Successive Prosecution Policy,” and informally as the “Petite 
Policy,” it “precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal 
prosecution, following a prior state or federal prosecution based on 
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investigate or prosecute because another country has already done so will go 
nowhere.” Id. at 65. 
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substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s) . . . .”213 There are 
three criteria pursuant to which the DOJ will set aside this policy: 
(1) if the matter involves a “substantial federal interest”; (2) the 
prior prosecution “ha[s] left that interest demonstrably 
unvindicated”; and (3) the DOJ believes that the conduct in 
question actually constitutes a violation of federal law and that 
there is enough evidence to gain a conviction.214 This policy does 
not provide defendants with any legal protections—it is merely a 
self-imposed guideline for the DOJ, although generally abided by 
“in the sense that the federal government rarely engages in double 
prosecution domestically.”215 
The Petite Policy’s background provides strong support for 
applying it to FCPA cases. It originated from U.S. Attorney 
General William Rogers’ memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys’ 
offices, addressing the Supreme Court cases that established there 
is no violation of double jeopardy in state-federal successive 
prosecutions.216 The memorandum stated: 
[T]he mere existence of a power, of course, does not mean 
that it should necessarily be exercised           It is our duty 
to observe not only the rulings of the Court but the spirit 
of the rulings as well. In effect, the Court said that 
although the rule of the Lanza case is sound law, 
enforcement officers should use care in applying it. 
Applied indiscriminately and with bad judgment it, like 
most rules of law, could cause considerable hardship . . .  . 
[T]hose of us charged with law enforcement 
responsibilities have a particular duty to act wisely and 
with  self-restraint  in  this  area        We  should continue 
to make every effort to cooperate with state and local 
authorities to the end that the trial occur in the 
jurisdiction, whether it be state or federal, where the 
public interest is best served.217 
 
213. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 77, § 9-2.031(A); Davis, supra 
note 22, at 64. 
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Accepting that double jeopardy does not apply in 
multijurisdictional anti-bribery enforcement actions, the fact that 
the United States can bring an action does not mean that, as 
stated in the memo, that the power “should necessarily be 
exercised.”218 Furthermore, it makes sense for U.S. enforcement 
agencies to “act wisely and with self-restraint” in 
multijurisdictional enforcement actions and to cooperate with 
other countries’ authorities to ensure that the action is brought 
“where the public interest is best served.”219 
That is not to say that the United States should not be able to 
bring its own action if there is a strong policy interest. The Petite 
Policy lays out situations in which the federal government has a 
strong interest in bringing its own action after a state has already 
done so, several of which would apply well to FCPA cases.220 For 
example, the federal government has an interest if there was no 
conviction in the first case as a result of “incompetence, 
corruption, intimidation, or undue influence.”221 In a foreign 
bribery case, the country with the strongest jurisdictional ties 
might decline to prosecute for any of these reasons, and in that 
situation, the United States should be able to bring its own action. 
Even if the United States is not the most appropriate country to 
prosecute, the bad actor should not go unpunished. 
Another situation in which the Petite Policy deems the federal 
government to have an interest is when the first case did result in 
a conviction but “the prior sentence was manifestly inadequate in 
light of the federal interest involved and a substantially enhanced 
sentence—including forfeiture and restitution as well as 
imprisonment and fines—is available through the contemplated 
federal prosecution . . . .”222 U.S. enforcement agencies may 
already be using this as justification for involvement in 
multijurisdictional enforcement actions where U.S. ties are 
weak—they might think that other countries’ fines and penalties 
are insufficient. If this is in fact the justification, it would be  
fairer to companies to make this publicly known, and to be clear 
about why the other countries’ fines and penalties are insufficient. 
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Transparency will create more predictability in the outcome. 
Lastly, the Petite Policy establishes four reasons for self- 
restraint in state-federal successive prosecutions: (1) “to vindicate 
substantial federal interests through appropriate federal 
prosecutions”; (2) “to protect persons charged with criminal 
conduct from the burdens associated with multiple prosecutions 
and punishments for substantially the same act(s) or 
transaction(s)”; (3) “to promote efficient utilization of Department 
resources”; and (4) “to promote coordination and cooperation 
between federal and state prosecutors.”223 All four of these are 
strong reasons to implement a policy of self-restraint in FCPA 
cases. 
C. The New DOJ Policy Against “Piling On” 
On May 9, 2018, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein 
announced a new DOJ policy against “piling on,” to be 
incorporated into the United States Attorneys’ Manual.224 The 
policy, while not specific to the FCPA, encourages cooperation 
between different DOJ units and other enforcement agencies, both 
foreign and domestic, to avoid duplicative penalties for the same 
misconduct.225 Rosenstein, who announced the new policy during 
a speech to the New York City Bar White Collar Crime Institute, 
stated that “[i]t is important for [the DOJ] to be aggressive in 
pursuing wrongdoers. But we should discourage disproportionate 
enforcement of laws by multiple authorities.”226 Like the Petite 
Policy, this new policy against “piling on” is not enforceable, but 
according to Rosenstein, is “another step towards greater 
transparency and consistency in corporate enforcement.”227 
Rosenstein cited several reasons for the new policy. First, he 
noted that companies in highly regulated industries must answer 
to multiple regulatory authorities, which “creates a risk of 
repeated punishments that may exceed what is necessary to 
rectify the harm and deter future violations.”228 Second, he 
explained that attorneys within the DOJ were concerned about 
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duplicative penalties and the impact those duplicative penalties 
have on the DOJ’s reputation for fairness; those attorneys were in 
favor of increased cooperation “to achieve reasonable and 
proportionate outcomes.”229 Lastly, Rosenstein cited the negative 
consequences of “piling on” to companies and the enforcement 
agencies: companies, including “innocent employees, customers, 
and investors,” are left uncertain as to whether the issue has been 
fully resolved, and DOJ resources are perhaps not used in the 
most efficient manner.230 
The new policy has four components.231 First, the  DOJ  
should not use enforcement for reasons unrelated to the criminal 
activity in question—a reiteration of existing policy.232 Second, 
DOJ units should coordinate with each other to “achieve an 
overall equitable result,” which may include crediting for 
penalties, fines, and forfeitures.233 Third, DOJ attorneys are 
encouraged, “when possible,” to coordinate with other enforcement 
agencies—federal, state, local, and foreign—that seek to resolve 
cases for the same underlying misconduct.234 The last component 
lists several factors to be considered when determining whether to 
impose duplicative penalties: “the egregiousness of the 
wrongdoing; statutory mandates regarding penalties; the risk of 
delay in finalizing a resolution; and the adequacy and timeliness 
of a company’s disclosures and cooperation with the 
Department.”235 
The last component of the policy is key: the DOJ will seek to 
avoid “piling on,” but only in certain situations. Rosenstein in fact 
made a statement to that effect: “Sometimes, penalties that may 
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appear duplicative really are essential to achieve justice and 
protect the public. In those cases, we will not hesitate to pursue 
complete remedies, and to assist our law enforcement partners in 
doing the same.”236 While the listed factors may give companies 
some indication of whether the DOJ will seek duplicative 
penalties, it is questionable how much the factors will really 
help.237 For example, how is a company to determine how 
egregious the DOJ will perceive the wrongdoing? 
Rosenstein also cited the practical concerns of cooperation as 
a reason duplicative penalties are imposed, such as limits on 
information-sharing, the timing of each agency’s action, and 
diplomatic relations.238 This further undercuts the effect of the 
policy from the perspective of companies—a company deciding 
whether to voluntarily disclose may not be able to use these 
factors to assess whether duplicative penalties will be imposed.239 
The DOJ’s acknowledgment of duplicative fines as an issue is 
a positive sign.240 However, the policy’s language is vague and 
contains ideas that seem to undercut the policy’s goals. Time will 
tell if the policy is an effective solution to the problem. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Foreign bribery is a serious concern for international business 
and it hurts the people who live in the countries where bribes are 
taken.241 The United States, through the FCPA, has made 
significant progress in this area, leveling the playing field and 
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weeding out corruption. However, now that the rest of the world  
is catching up, the United States might consider adopting a policy 
of self-restraint in foreign bribery cases where its connection is 
minimal and when other countries with stronger ties are bringing 
enforcement actions. There is nothing wrong with overlapping 
jurisdiction as long as the aggressive enforcers keep themselves in 
check, and as long as they do so, there is no need for strict 
adherence to double jeopardy principles. However, in cases where 
the United States does feel it needs to be involved and the 
connection is not obvious, the enforcement agencies should be 
clear and transparent about the policy reasons for involvement 
and the portion of global settlement money taken for the U.S. 
Treasury. 
